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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Just after eleven o’clock in the morning on October 29, 2012—a rainy 
Monday in D.C.—the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.1  The case raised important questions of copyright 
law, and discussions of statutory interpretation and policy took center stage.2  
Justice Elena Kagan, however, wanted to talk about whether a certain 
passage in a prior case, Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research 
 
 1.  Transcript of Oral Argument, 132 S. Ct. 1905 (2012) (No. 11-697). 
 2.  See Ronald Mann, Argument recap: Justices skeptical of publisher’s position in gray-market 
copyright case, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 31, 2012, revised 3:20 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=154545. 
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International, Inc.,3 was mere “ill-considered dicta” that should be ignored.  
Representing the petitioner, Joshua Rosenkranz hesitated only a few seconds 
before answering:  “To put it bluntly, yes,” he said.4  “That’s my ultimate 
position.”5  In Kirtsaeng, the importance of distinguishing between dicta and 
holding was clear.  If the passage were treated as a holding, Kirtsaeng had 
already lost the case.  If dicta, the question remained open. 
Below, even the Second Circuit panel that ruled against Kirtsaeng had 
described the Quality King passage as dicta.6  Nonetheless, arguing for the 
respondent, former solicitor general Ted Olson would not let such a stark 
path to victory go untried.  In his opening remarks, he referenced the passage 
and argued that “referring to it as dicta misstates what was going on, on [sic] 
the Quality King case.”7  Only then was he interrupted, by an incredulous 
Justice Samuel Alito, asking if he truly wanted to argue that the passage was 
not dicta.8  Olson assured Justice Alito he did, prompting the justice to ask 
pointedly, “It was the holding of the case?”9  Olson responded that the 
passage was a holding inasmuch as the Court felt it “necessary” to include 
it.10  He then retreated slightly by claiming he did not want to spend much 
time arguing about the definition of dicta.11 
~~~~ 
This Essay is about dicta.  Like Olson, the Essay will not spend much 
time arguing about the definition of dicta.  Rather, it analyzes rule of law 
issues as they pertain to dicta.  Does the definition of dicta matter?  Does 
reliance on dicta by subsequent courts raise rule of law concerns?  The 
answer to both questions is yes. 
II.  RULE OF LAW FUNDAMENTALS 
Defining the term “rule of law” would not merely take a paper itself, or 
even a book.  It is the work of a generation, and it may yet prove impossible.  
Nonetheless, competing definitions typically include several specific 
elements that no one sees fit to deny.12  These concepts subserve the rule of 
 
 3.  523 U.S. 135 (1998), overruled in part by Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-
697, 2013 WL 1104736 (S. Ct. Mar. 19, 2013). 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id. 
 6.  John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 217–18 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 7.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 24. 
 8.  See id. at 25. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See David Kinley, Human Rights, Globalization, and the Rule of Law: Friends, Foes, or 
Family?, 7 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 239, 247 (2002) (“Most, if not all, modern 
formulations of the rule of law have common base elements, even if their categorization, and the 
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law in vital but distinct ways. 
A.  Procedural Rule of Law Safeguards 
In his seminal essay on the topic, Joseph Raz included among eight 
“guiding principles” to the rule of law the proposition that “[t]he making of 
particular laws (particular legal orders) should be guided by open, stable, 
clear, and general rules.”13  More recently, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky 
cited the precept as “unassailable,” before beginning his own list of critical 
considerations with the statement that “[t]he rule of law requires the 
formation of general laws according to set procedures.”14  Professor 
Chemerinsky’s second rule—“Laws must be general, prospective, and 
clearly stated”—dovetails nicely with the first.15  Together, they establish, at 
a minimum, that lawmaking should be transparent, and laws clear and 
retrospective. 
1.  Transparent Lawmaking According to Established Procedure 
In addition to clearly outlining how laws are to be enacted—bicameral 
passage and presentment for legislation,16 advice and consent of the Senate 
for treaties,17 and Article V amendment protocols18—the United States 
Constitution contains the curious requirement that Congress “shall keep a 
Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same.”19 Along 
with the very design of the nation’s capitol building, with its large galleries 
that House proceedings may be viewed by the public,20 the provisions 
demonstrate, as a historical matter, that Americans have always valued 
transparent lawmaking according to strict rules.  While somewhat 
groundbreaking at the time, expectations of transparency and regularity have 
never waned and now stand as fundamental rule of law elements. 
 
reasons for such, differ between leading commentators.  These are that the notion comprises rules of 
general application; that government is bound by rules; and, that rules are prospective and publicly 
accessible such that the legal implications of one’s future actions may be predicted.”). 
 13.  Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 8 (Robert L. 
Cunningham ed., 1979). 
 14.  Toward a Practical Definition of the Rule of Law, 46 No. 4 JUDGES’ J. Fall 2007, at 5. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 17.  Id. at art. II, § 2. 
 18.  See id. at art. V. 
 19.  Id. at art. I, § 5. 
 20.  See Akhil Reed Amar, Addison C. Harris Lecture March 20, 2002, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 674–76 
(2002). 
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2.  Prospective Law 
Another rule-of-law fundamental with a constitutional pedigree,21 the 
requirement that laws not be applied retroactively relies on the idea that one 
cannot violate a nonexistent law and should not be published for conduct 
contrary to a later-enacted law.22  Afterall, “[o]ne cannot be guided by a 
retroactive law that does not exist at the time of action.”23  But the 
Constitution’s prohibition of ex post facto laws is limited in two 
fundamental ways: it applies only to criminal law, and it applies only to 
legislatively enacted law.24  Judicial lawmaking is exempted.25  While this 
potentially raises rule of law concerns, it also makes sense because the 
common law necessarily has a retrospective element.26 
Nonetheless, the very fiber of the common law method lays these fears 
to rest.  The common law method relies on custom, history, precedent, and 
analogy to reach, through reasoned analysis, a rule that fits.27  That is, 
ideally, the rule created is a rule that could conceivably be predicted by 
anyone who grasped related precedents.28  The common law method is thus 
 
 21.  See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9–10.  
 22.  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (“[T]he plain and obvious meaning and 
intention of the prohibition is this; that the Legislatures of the several states, shall not pass laws, after 
a fact done by a subject, or citizen, which shall have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for 
having done it.  The prohibition considered in this light, is an additional bulwark in favour of the 
personal security of the subject, to protect his person from punishment by legislative acts, having a 
retrospective operation.”). 
 23.  Raz, supra note 13, at 7. 
 24.  HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 619 (1994). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on Commentaries, in A COMMENT ON THE 
COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 3, 50 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977) 
(“[T]he common law . . . is but a series of ex-post facto laws.”); Robert Rantoul, Oration at Scituate, 
in AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 317, 317 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1991) (“Judge-made law is ex 
post facto law.”). 
 27.  See Andrew J. Wistrich, The Evolving Temporality of Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 737, 
764 (2012) (“Common law adjudication is decision-making by courts based not on the constitution 
or on a statute, but instead on reasoning by analogy from precedents.”); THEODOR F. T. PLUCKNETT, 
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 307, 347–50 (5th ed. 1956) (identifying the importance 
of custom in the creation of the law and distinguishing between custom and precedent); Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881), in THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 5 
(1982) (“The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or formula.”).  But see 
Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REV. 475 
486–87 (1933) (arguing that custom no longer plays an important role in the development of the 
common law). 
 28.  Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Codes and the Arrangements of Law, 44 HARV. L. REV. 725, 725 
(1931) (reprinted from 5 AM. L. REV. 1 (1870) (“It is the merit of the common law that it decides the 
case first and determines the principle afterwards. . . .  [L]awyers, like other men, frequently see well 
enough how they ought to decide on a given state of facts without being very clear as to the ratio 
decidendi.”).  But see Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 390 
(1981) (arguing that, at least in constitutional cases, stare decisis provides “all the predictability of a 
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not seen as a threat to the rule of law.29 
3.  Clear Law 
Again, America’s dedication to clear, accessible law is plainly 
demonstrated by the historical record.  While the Founders chose to draft the 
Constitution in secrecy, a seeming violation of the policy favoring 
transparency, the decision was made to encourage unguarded discussion30 
and ultimately reinforced the primacy of the document’s text.31  The 
Constitution had to be clear enough “to speak for itself.”32  The text would 
govern rather than the intent of the Founders.33  And, under closer 
inspection, the opaque proceedings had no rule-of-law implications.  This is 
so because the lawmaking occurred with public debate and ratification and 
was thus eminently transparent.34  Until nine states approved of it, the draft 
Constitution was a dead letter.35 
Clarity in the law has since become a standard component of most every 
formulation of the rule of law.36  The underlying premise is that “legal 
commands” should be “deductively applicable, and that vague norms—of 
the sort with which one is left if legal commands are not deductively 
applicable—are inconsistent with those basic [rule of law] values.”37  This 
 
lighting bolt: it will strike on occasion but when and where can only be known after the fact”). 
 29.  See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142–43 (1921) 
(“Acquiescence in such a method has its basis in the belief that when the law has left the situation 
uncovered by any pre-existing rule, there is nothing to do except to have some impartial arbiter 
declare what fair and reasonable men, mindful of the habits of life of the community, and of the 
standards of justice and fair dealing prevalent among them, ought in such circumstances to do, with 
no rules except those of custom and conscience to regulate their conduct.”).  Cf. Raz, supra note 13 
at 7 (“Sometimes it is known for certain that a retroactive law will be enacted, and when this 
happens retroactivity does not conflict with the rule of law . . . .”). 
 30.  See Jared Sparks, Journal April 19, 1830 reprinted in MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 479 (1911). 
 31.  Robert J. Pushaw, Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of the 
Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV 447, 470–71 (1994). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 
903 (1985). 
 34.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 6 (2005); see also 
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 12 (1996) 
(“The idea was that the entire people, through the mechanism of the convention and subsequent 
popular ratification, were the creators of the constitution.”). 
 35.  Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 36.  See, e.g., Raz, supra note 13, at 7 (“An ambiguous, vague, obscure, or imprecise law is 
likely to mislead or confuse at least some of those who desire to be guided by it.”).  
 37.  Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of 
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erudite formulation may obfuscate the simple idea: Because clear laws lend 
themselves more readily to clear applications, they are more consistent with 
the rule of law than vague laws, which might be interpreted inconsistently.  
And, of course, if a law is unclear on its face such that one cannot guess how 
it might possibly be applied, there is no predictability.38 
B.  Predictable Outcomes 
While it may be true that legal realism—the cynical view that the 
outcome of any given case is likely to depend on what the judge had for 
breakfast39—is here to stay,40 few would deny that predictability is a vital 
rule of law ingredient.41  Indeed, Professor Michael C. Dorf, who seems 
quite resigned to indeterminacy in the law, points out that such uncertainty 
represents a conflict with the rule of law ideal.42  But any number of scholars 
argue that legal realism or indeterminacy does not necessarily yield 
meaningful unpredictability.43  Thus, legal realism is only incompatible with 
the rule of law depending on how one defines predictability,44 and the 
question is not whether a jurisprudential approach can be denominated 
“legal realism,” but whether it creates significant unpredictability of 
outcomes. 
The primacy of predictability is readily apparent—those governed by 
 
Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 925, 992–93 (1996). 
 38.  See MICHAEL FOUCALT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 95 (2d ed. 1995).  Under the heading, “The 
rule of perfect certainty,” Foucalt writes, “The laws that define the crime and lay down the penalties 
must be perfectly clear, so that each member of society may distinguish criminal actions from 
virtuous actions.”  Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
 39.  See Karl N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the New Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 
581, 592 (1940). 
 40.  Or, as the cliché goes, “we’re all legal realists now.”  See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Rethinking 
Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 (1997); see also 
Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity & Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 
579 n.54 (1993) (“Only ordinary citizens, some jurisprudes, and first-year law students have a 
working conception of law as determinate.”). 
 41.  See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (3d ed. 2000) (citing 
“predictability” along with “stability” and “reliance” as “‘rule of law’ values”); Antonin Scalia, The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (citing the importance of 
“predictability” before noting its pedigree: “Even in simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as 
incompatible with the Rule of Law”). 
 42.  See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 
877 (2003); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 12 
(1960) (noting that the advent of legal realism seemed to place rule of law in doubt). 
 43.  See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1915 (2005). 
 44.  See Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 339, 349–
50 (1996) (“The rule of law concern goes to whether people can predict how the legal system is 
likely to come to bear on them, and the sociological aspects of the indeterminacy thesis demonstrate 
that a high degree of predictability, with respect to some or even many legal propositions, is 
compatible with the indeterminacy thesis.”). 
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the law should understand how it will apply to them before being subjected 
to it.45  In a sense, such predictability is the name of the game: 
The reason why [lawyering] is a profession, why people will pay 
lawyers to argue for them or to advise them, is that in societies like 
ours the command of the public force is intrusted [sic] to the judges 
in certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, 
if necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees. People want 
to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the 
risk of coming against what is so much stronger than themselves, 
and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to 
be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction 
of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of 
the courts.46 
In a global economy, as companies spread across different nations and 
necessarily entangle themselves with various legal systems, the importance 
of predictability has become paramount.47  For this reason, it can be argued 
that rule of law is legal predictability.48  Given that other indispensable Rule 
of Law elements listed in Part II.A all yield more predictability in the law, 
such a conclusions is not far-fetched. 
III.  FOLLOWING THE DICTATES OF DICTA 
A.  Defining Dicta 
While defining dicta is surely easier than defining the rule of law, 
Black’s Legal Dictionary comes up short,49 and there is no real consensus on 
 
 45.  See Oliver Wendel Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897); Raz, 
supra note 13, at 7–8; see also Judge Samuel L. Bufford, Defining the Rule of Law, 46 No. 4 
JUDGES’ J., Fall 2007, at  20  (“It is especially important that individuals whose conduct is impacted 
by a law have reasonable access to the text of the law so that they can conform their actions to the 
law’s requirements.”). 
 46.  Holmes, supra note 45, at 457. 
 47.  See generally James R. Maxeiner, Some Realism About Legal Certainty in the Globalization 
of the Rule of Law, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 27, 30 (2008). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 959 
(2005).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines dicta as “1. A statement of opinion or belief considered 
authoritative because of the dignity of the person making it.  2. A familiar rule; a maxim.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 485 (8th ed. 2004).  
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the correct definition.50  Rather than endeavoring to define the term, I will 
trot out a pair of definitions for consideration.  Classically, dicta is regarded 
as any portion of the opinion that is inessential to the outcome.51  Observing 
that some cases are decided in a less linear fashion—and often even with 
twin rationales, neither of which is necessarily superior—Professors Michael 
Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns propose a more narrow definition in their 
thorough treatment of the topic:52 “A holding consists of those propositions 
along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually 
decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the 
judgment.  If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.”53  
Courts that distinguish between “judicial dicta” and “obiter dictum,” and 
find the former binding (or nearly so) seem to follow a similar definition of 
dicta.54  As we shall see, and perhaps counter-intuitively, broader definitions 
of dicta seem to yield more predictability than the classic, narrow definition, 
which is impossible to apply consistently. 
B.  Article III Limitations 
Under a different system, giving dicta the force of law might present no 
rule of law concerns.  Under the American system, however, as a 
precedential and prudential matter, dicta cannot serve as binding precedent.55  
As Chief Justice John Marshall explained: 
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in 
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which 
those expressions are used.  If they go beyond the case, they may be 
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit 
when the very point is presented for decision.  The reason of this 
 
 50.  United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th. Cir. 1988) (describing dictum as “a term 
variously defined”). 
 51.  See, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 261 (1921) (“In 
order that an opinion may have the weight of a precedent, . . . it must be an opinion the formation of 
which is necessary for the decision of a particular case; in other words, it must not be obiter 
dictum.”). 
 52.  See generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams, supra note 49.   
 53.  Id.. 
 54.  See, e.g., Cerro Metal Products v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 979–80 & n.39 (3d. Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (1975) (“[A] distinction should be drawn between ‘obiter 
dictum,’ which constitutes an aside or an unnecessary extension of comments, and considered or 
‘judicial dictum’ where the Court, as in this case, is providing a construction of a statute to guide the 
future conduct of inferior courts.  While such dictum is not binding upon us, it must be given 
considerable weight and can not be ignored in the resolution of the close question we have to 
decide.”); Gabbs Exploration Co. v. Udall, 315 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Malcolm v. Honeoye 
Falls-Lima Educ. Ass’n, 678 F. Supp. 2d 100 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 55.  See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626–27 (1935); Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399–400 (1821). 
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maxim is obvious.  The question actually before the Court is 
investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.  Other 
principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their 
relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other 
cases is seldom completely investigated.56 
It is now widely accepted that the rule is of constitutional dimension—
by limiting the judiciary’s power to actual cases and controversies, Article 
III divests judges any power to issue advisory opinions.57  Dicta is, at 
bottom, a form of advisory opinion for future cases.58 
Because of the Article III and precedential limitations on the power of 
judges to make binding law via dictum, courts and lawyers rightly 
distinguish between holding and dictum when conducting legal analysis.59  
 
 56.  Cohens, 19 U.S. at 399–400. 
 57.  See Judge Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1259 (2006); Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 953, 1067 & n.355 (2005); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 
2049 (1994); see also Robert J. Pushaw, supra note 31, at 447 (noting that Article III “justiciability 
presupposes that a federal judge's primary function is to resolve disputes, not to declare the law”).  
But see Shawn J. Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 125, 151–52 (2009) 
(expressing “skepticism” that Article III limits federal judges from using dicta to make law). 
 58.  The aptness of equating dicta and advisory opinions is revealed in United States v. Fruehauf, 
365 U.S. 146 (1961), wherein  Justice Felix Frankfurter described advisory opinions as:  
advance expressions of legal judgment upon issues which remain unfocused 
because they are not pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness 
provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for 
decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a 
multifaced situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests . . . .  
 Id. at 157.  Justice Frankfurter could just as well be describing dicta.  But see Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 21 (1998) (distinguishing dicta from advisory opinions).  Professor Krotosyzynksi’s conclusion 
seems to rely on the following syllogism: 
 All dicta is constitutional. 
 And no advisory opinions are constitutional. 
 Thus, no advisory opinions are dicta. 
  While the logic holds up, the simplistic premises birth simplistic analysis.  The question 
should turn on the force of law given, not whether it can be dubbed an “advisory opinion” or “dicta.”  
When dicta is given the force of law, it is transmuted into an impermissible advisory opinion.  And 
when an ostensible advisory opinion is not given the force of law, it is unproblematic dicta.  Thus, 
just as a judge “cannot transmute dictum into decision by waving a wand and uttering the word 
‘hold,’” United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69 n.2 (1979) (Friendly, J., concurring), and just as 
labeling dicta an “advisory opinion” alters its propriety “not one whit,” Evan Tsen Lee, 
Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 51 HARV. L. REV. 605, 650 (1992), 
so too, calling an opinion “advisory” does not transform it into a violation of Article III’s case or 
controversy requirement. 
 59.  See, e.g., Barbour v. Int'l Union, 594 F.3d 315, 321–22 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding portions 
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Being relegated to a lower status, dicta ostensibly does not have the force of 
law, is therefore not expected to have the force of law, and is thus rightly not 
relied on as law.60 
C.  When Dicta Dictates 
If courts are not treating dicta as governing law, this paper is a purely 
academic exercise.  But, arguably, dictum governs in at least two fairly 
common circumstances.  First, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a view of dicta 
narrow enough that Judge Pierre N. Leval on the Second Circuit has accused 
it of overstepping Article III’s boundaries, writing that, under the Ninth 
Circuit approach, “a court has the power to make binding law, at least on an 
issue argued by the parties, simply by announcing a rule, irrespective of 
whether the rule plays any functional role in the court’s decision of the 
case—a very considerable power, and without constitutional justification.”61  
Second, dicta and holding are regularly conflated.  In all circuits, dictum is 
often inadvertently treated as binding authority.  Judges fail to perceive the 
difference between dicta and holding and consequently treat the former as 
the latter.  Finally, the jurisprudence of Justice William Brennan suggests 
that a judge, taking the long view, can use dicta to purposely shape the law 
through suspect means.  This Part considers the rule of law implications of 
both the Ninth Circuit’s narrow view of dicta and the commonplace 
conflation of dicta and holding before examining Justice Brennan’s 
technique of loading opinions with calculated dicta later relied on as 
precedent. 
1.  The Ninth Circuit: A Case Study 
a.  The definition of dicta tested 
In the Ninth Circuit, the Chief Judge is exasperated.62  Dicta’s got him 
down.63  Over the course of several years, and several cases, he has waged 
 
of a previous Fourth Circuit case represented “classic judicial dictum” and that, therefore, the case 
was not binding); Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 762–63 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(declining to follow dicta from a previous Eleventh Circuit opinion); see also RUGGERO J. 
ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT 261 (2d ed. 2003) (noting 
that appellate judges inquire whether a cited proposition “originated in a thorough, well-reasoned 
opinion that was itself based on binding precedent”). 
 60.  See, e.g., United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[A] dictum is not 
authoritative.  It is the part of an opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior court, is free to 
reject.”). 
 61.  Leval, supra note 57, at 1251. 
 62.  John Roemer, 9th Circuit Dukes it Out Over Dicta, DAILY J., Feb. 26, 2010, available at 
http://www.nonpublication.com/roemer2.26.10.htm. 
 63.  See id. 
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war with Judge A. Wallace Tashima over what constitutes binding 
precedent.  While a survey of Ninth Circuit cases illustrate that he is winning 
the debate, Judge Tashima disregards such holdings—as dicta.  The first 
skirmish took place in United States v. Johnson,64 in which a majority of the 
Ninth Circuit panel joined Judge Kozinski’s concurrence purporting to 
define dicta, as contradistinguished from the position taken in Tashima’s 
concurrence in the same opinion.  Kozinski fired the opening salvo: 
Judge Tashima’s concurrence raises a fundamental question 
concerning the development of our circuit law: To what extent is a 
later panel bound by statements of law contained in opinions of an 
earlier panel?  Judge Tashima would hold that a later panel is free to 
ignore statements in an earlier opinion—even statements supported 
by reasoned analysis—if the later panel concludes that the earlier 
ruling is not necessary to the result reached.65 
Note that Judge Tashima’s definition of dicta essentially captures the 
classic definition—that which is not necessary to the holding is dicta.66  
Indeed, Tashima recognizes that his definition “reflects the centuries-long 
development of the common law.”67  That a majority of the en banc panel 
disagree matters not because: 
By definition, dictum is an unnecessary statement made by the 
majority; unless a statement is made by a majority, there is no need 
to engage in an analysis of whether that particular statement is 
dictum or a holding. . . . [And], an ipse dixit labeling a statement as 
a “holding” does not make it so.68 
Of course, Judge Kozinski did not view the conclusion of the 
concurrence as mere ipse dixit.  Rather, it fit perfectly his definition—
“where a panel confronts an issue germane to the eventual resolution of the 
case, and resolves it after reasoned consideration in a published opinion, that 
ruling becomes the law of the circuit, regardless of whether doing so is 
necessary in some strict logical sense.”69  Because the discussion of holding 
and dicta was germane to the eventual resolution of the case, because it was 
 
 64.  United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 65.  Id. at 914 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
 66.  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 67.  Johnson, 256 F.3d at 920 (Tashima, J., concurring). 
 68.  Id. at 921. 
 69.  Id. at 914 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
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resolved after reasoned discussion, and because it appeared in a published 
opinion, it constituted a holding—not because it was labeled as such. 
Interestingly, Judge Kozinski relied on rule of law fundamentals in 
fashioning this broad definition.  Observing that “judges often disagree 
about what is and is not necessary to the resolution of a case,” and that they 
“often confront cases raising multiple issues that could be dispositive, yet [] 
find it appropriate to resolve several, in order to avoid repetition of errors on 
remand or provide guidance for future cases,” and that they “occasionally 
find it appropriate to offer alternative rationales for the results they reach,” 
Chief Judge Kozinski reasoned that Judge Tashima’s narrow definition 
would leave litigants and their attorneys at a loss when attempting to predict 
the law: 
If later panels could dismiss the work product of earlier panels quite 
so easily, much of our circuit law would be put in doubt.  No longer 
would the question be whether an issue was resolved by an earlier 
panel.  Rather, lawyers advising their clients would have to guess 
whether a later panel will recognize a ruling that is directly on point 
as also having been necessary.  We decline to introduce such 
uncertainty into the law of our circuit.70 
Four years later, in Barapind v. Enomoto, the debate repeated itself, 
except this time the definition of dicta was applied in a traditional majority 
opinion.71  Moreover, the en banc panel purported to expressly overrule a 
prior Ninth Circuit case with a narrower definition of dicta.72  The stakes had 
been raised.  But Judge Tashima remained unmoved, declaring, “the 
discussion about dicta is dicta.”73 
While Barapind is essentially a recapitulation of the competing theories 
advanced in Johnson, an intervening case in which the judges squabbled 
across concurring opinions offers less abstract evidence that Chief Judge 
Kozinski’s definition might advance the rule of law ideal better than Judge 
Tashima’s.  In 2003, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit decided Miller v. 
Gammie,74 devoting the final portion of the opinion to a determination of 
whether it was necessary for an en banc panel to overrule an opinion that 
 
 70.  Id. at 914–15. 
 71.  See 400 F.3d 744, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 72.  See id. at 750 n.8.   
 73.  See id. at 758 (Tashima, J., concurring) (“We are now sitting en banc, and therefore can 
declare the law as we believe it to be regardless of what we have previously held.  This is so no 
matter whether a particular part of a prior opinion was necessary to its decision or not.  Thus, there is 
no point to holding that Quinn’s ‘incidental to’ discussion is, or is not, dicta; instead, we can, and 
should, decide whether its discussion is now the law of the circuit because it ought to be, and 
whether the district court got it right or wrong.”). 
 74.  335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003). 
KILLIANPLRONLINERTF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/13  1:50 PM 
[Vol. 2013: 1, 2013] Dicta and the Rule of Law 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
13 
had been thoroughly rejected, but not expressly overruled, by the Supreme 
Court.75  The court’s determination was clear: “We hold that the issues 
decided by the higher court need not be identical in order to be 
controlling.”76 
It was not lost on Judge Tashima that this “holding,” while important for 
guiding lower courts, was not necessary to the resolution of the case.  
Concurring, he wrote that the final part, “while technically dicta, is 
nonetheless authoritative and binding precedent for this circuit.”77  The 
nature of the court in its en banc form, exercising a “supervisory role,” led 
Judge Tashima to conclude that: 
When, as here, the guidance of the en banc court is necessary to 
ensure that future three-judge panels will act consistently regarding 
the binding effect of precedent, it is eminently appropriate for the en 
banc court to address matters that, while not necessary to the 
decision of the case, are vital to “the administration and 
development of the law of the circuit.78 
Thoroughly unimpressed, Chief Judge Kozinski wrote that Judge 
Tashima’s approach to dicta had “just flunked its first reality-check.”79  
Kozinski’s chief criticism of Tashima’s view was that it turned the inquiry 
into a guessing game, arguing that “[t]hese infinitely amorphous inquiries 
undermine the guidance litigants are entitled to expect from our en banc 
opinions.”80 
b.  Rule of law implications 
Although there is room for debate regarding whether the Ninth Circuit 
majority approach comports with the Constitution’s cases and controversies 
requirement,81 or whether it conflicts with Supreme Court precedent,82 it 
 
 75.  See id. at 899–900. 
 76.  Id. at 900. 
 77.  See id. at 902 (Tashima, J., concurring). 
 78.  See id. at 903–04 (quoting United States v. Am.-Foreign S. S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689 
(1960)). 
 79.  See id at 900 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
 80.  See id. at 901. 
 81.  See, e.g., Leval, supra note 58, at 1251. 
 82.  Ironically, the Ninth Circuit’s definition of dicta may be invalid, by its definition.  The 
Supreme Court has adopted the broad view of dicta—that which is not necessary to the decision is 
dicta.  See, e.g., Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 431 (2001) (reasoning that a prior 
proposition by the Court “was unquestionably dictum because it was not essential to our disposition 
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seems to be more compatible with the rule of law than the narrow definition 
of dicta proposed by Judge Tashima.  As discussed above, the rule of law 
demands predictability above all else.  But under the Tashima approach, 
distinguishing between dicta and holding—and thus identifying binding 
law—can be a fool’s errand.  As Kozinski observed, even judges sometimes 
cannot tell what portions are necessary to the resolution of the case.83  And 
Tashima’s willingness to create a new exception to his rule illustrates its 
failings. 
Kozinski’s approach is adequately transparent and clear because it 
requires “reasoned consideration in a published opinion.”84  Published 
opinions, by their nature, receive more attention than unpublished opinions, 
and the “reasoned consideration” prong requires judges to explain to 
lawyers, fellow judges, and the people how they reached their conclusion.  
Further, the procedure for making law is thus established. 
By contrast, Tashima’s approach establishes no procedure for making 
law.  Whether law has been made or not is a backward-looking inquiry, and 
it has nothing to do with the process.  Instead judges and lawyers must 
analyze the prior case and determine what portions of the analysis were 
necessary to its final disposition.  Under Tashima’s approach, broad swaths 
of important opinions like Marbury v. Madison85 and National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius86 are likely dicta.  Further, his consistent 
 
of any of the issues contested in” the case).  One would think that the Ninth Circuit would accord at 
least as much deference to Supreme Court statements as it would to statements made in the Ninth 
Circuit, meaning that the “law of the circuit” should include statements made by the Supreme Court 
that satisfy the narrow definition of dicta.  This is especially true given that, as a rule, Supreme Court 
dicta is given “great weight,” even when recognized as not binding.  Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho 
v. Hammond, 384 F.3d 674, 683 (9th Cir. 2004).  Under the Ninth Circuit view of dicta, however, 
the Supreme Court’s broad view of dicta should possibly govern—if the definition of dicta was “an 
issue germane to the eventual resolution of the case” and was resolved “after reasoned 
consideration.”  See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, C.J., 
concurring).  This potentially creates an endless feedback loop: if the Ninth Circuit’s majority 
approach to dicta controls, it is invalid pursuant to contrary Supreme Court precedent; and if it is 
invalid, the Supreme Court’s statements on the matter are also dicta, meaning the Ninth Circuit is 
free to impose the Kozinski rule. 
 83.  Johnson, 256 F.3d at 914. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 86.  132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).  Because the statute at issue was ultimately rescued via a saving 
construction that found it valid under Congress’s taxing power, the discussion that it was invalid 
under the Commerce Clause was, arguably, not necessary to the case and thus dicta.  Or so the 
argument goes.  See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Do the Court’s Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper 
Clause Rulings in the Individual Mandate Case Matter?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 29, 2012, 
2:44 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/29/do-the-courts-commerce-clause-and-necessary-and-
proper-clause-rulings-in-the-individual-mandate-case-matter/.  It should come as no surprise, that 
academics argue over whether this is true.  See, e.g., Jonathan Adler, Lose the battle, win the war?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012 6:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/lose-the-battle-win-
the-war/ (arguing that the discussion is not dicta because the “analys[i]s form[s] an essential 
predicate to [Roberts’] ultimate conclusion that the mandate could be upheld as a tax”). 
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refusal to acquiesce to the majority view means that the state of the law in 
any given area may depend on who is on the panel, a proposition antithetical 
to predictability.  Creating confusion as to the law is not consistent with the 
rule of law, and that is exactly what Tashima’s approach threatens to do. 
2.  Unprincipled Conflation 
a.  Inadvertent Conflation 
The most banal use of dicta may also be the most pernicious.  In some 
cases, dicta is cited as law with no apparent realization by the judge that the 
adversarial process has played no significant role in producing a rule based 
on reason and adequately considered precedent. 
Later this term, the Supreme Court will consider The Standard Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Knowles,87 a class action case examining the pre-
certification fiduciary duties of class attorneys—specifically, whether they 
may stipulate to damages of less than $5 million in order to circumvent the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005’s (CAFA) removal provisions.88  Knowles 
is an odd case in that it went straight from an Arkansas district court to the 
Supreme Court.  The Eight Circuit declined to grant the defendant’s 
interlocutory appeal because the issue had already been settled in the circuit.  
But it had never been adequately considered. 
In Bell v. Hershey Co.,89 the question was what standard of proof 
governed questions of CAFA removal.90  After ruling that removal had been 
merited, Judge Diana E. Murphy unnecessarily wrote that, to prevent 
removal, “Bell could have included a binding stipulation with his petition 
stating that he would not seek damages greater than the jurisdictional 
minimum upon remand; it is too late to do so now.”91  Though the statement 
was dicta under any definition, three years later it worked itself into a rule 
statement in Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc.92  While the issue was 
 
 87.  No. 11-1450, cert. granted (U.S. Aug. 31, 2012). 
 88.  The Supreme Court, 11-1450 Standard Fire Insurance Company v. Knowles: Question 
Presented (Aug. 31, 2012), www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-01450qp.pdf; see also Ryan S. Killian, An 
Illusion of Sacrifice: The Incompatability of Binding Stipulations in CAFA Cases, 40  PEPP. L. REV. 
111, 133 (2012). 
 89.  557 F.3d 953 (8th. Cir. 2009). 
 90.  See id. at 956–57. 
 91.  Id.  at 958. 
 92.  666 F.3d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir. 2012) (“We have previously stated that a binding stipulation 
limiting damages sought to an amount not exceeding $5 million can be used to defeat CAFA 
jurisdiction.”). 
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briefed,93 Judge Raymond Gruender turned the dicta of Bell into the law of 
the circuit.94  Thus, the defendants’ arguments were unavailing; principles of 
stare decisis governed the outcome.  This two-step process represents a 
paradigmatic example of dicta transmuted into law, without so much as the 
wave of a wand.95 
b.  Justice Brennan and the art of surreptitious lawmaking 
In 1978, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., circulated a cautionary memo to 
his clerks: “I know from experience that [Justice William Brennan] has a 
demonstrated ability (that I admire) to shape future decisions by the 
inclusion of general language unnecessary to the present opinion but 
apparently free from serious objection.”96  Other members of the Supreme 
Court likewise “learned to watch for the seemingly innocuous casual 
statement or footnote—seeds that would be exploited to their logical 
extreme in later cases.”97  While, in theory, Justice Brennan opposed reliance 
on dicta as much as anyone,98 artful dicta is now regarded as a hallmark of 
his jurisprudence.99 
While it is perfectly possible (and indeed likely) that examples abound, 
it seems no one has undertaken to identify actual instances of Brennan’s 
ingenious disingenuity at work.  Unable to point to “classic” examples, a 
parsing of his opinions is necessary.  Goldberg v. Kelly100 seems to offer a 
fine specimen.  In that case, the issue was “whether the Due Process Clause 
requires that the recipient [of welfare benefits] be afforded an evidentiary 
 
 93.  See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 11–23, Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 666 F.3d 1069 
(8th Cir. 2012) (No. 11–3445), 2011 WL 6073918, at *11–23. 
 94.  See Rowling, 666 F.3d at 1072 (“We have previously stated that a binding stipulation 
limiting damages sought to an amount not exceeding $5 million can be used to defeat CAFA 
jurisdiction.”). 
 95.  As I have observed elsewhere, for whatever reason this specific CAFA-related issue seems 
to invite this mistake.  See Killian, supra note 89, at 139 & n.170 (describing the Sixth Circuit’s 
“recognition” of the right to stipulate to lower damages in a case that did not involve binding 
stipulations—dictum that became law when the panel did have occasion to consider the question). 
 96.  SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 444 (2010). 
 97.  Id. at 343. 
 98.  See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 700 n.1 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (accusing the 
majority of “transmuting [] dictum into law”); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 352–54 (1979) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (calling it “deeply disturbing . . . that the Court should engage in today’s 
gratuitous departure from customary judicial practice and reach out to decide an issue unnecessary to 
its holding” and maintaining that the purported holding at issue is “patently dicta”). 
 99.  Frank B. Cross, The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
693, 740 (2012); Adam Liptak, Souter’s Exit Opens Door for a More Influential Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/us/08court.html (“Justice 
Brennan [] took the long view, planting seeds in bland footnotes in the hope they would take root in 
other cases years later.”). 
 100.  397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
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hearing before the termination of benefits.”101 Writing for the majority, 
Brennan cited to a footnote in Shapiro v. Thompson102 for the proposition 
that a “constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that 
public assistance benefits are “a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right.’”103  The 
footnote was one he had authored the year prior.  And it relied, in turn, on 
Sherbert v. Verner,104 which he had penned six years before.  Goldberg thus 
represents an example of Brennan citing Brennan citing Brennan.  This, of 
itself, is no cause for concern.  Given the lengthy tenures of most Supreme 
Court justices and the number of opinions they produce in that time, such 
self-citations are inevitable.  But a close reading of these opinions suggests 
that this is no ordinary, incidental self-citation. 
The statement in Shapiro was plainly a dictum.  In Shapiro, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of state laws requiring one year of residency 
before local inhabitants could be eligible for welfare benefit.105  The case 
was argued twice and, on reargument, the respondents’ primary theory was 
that “the statutory prohibition of benefits to residents of less than a year 
creates a classification which constitutes an invidious discrimination 
denying them equal protection of the laws.”106  Brennan appended a footnote 
to this formulation of the appellees’ position, which read: “This 
constitutional challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public 
assistance benefits are a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right.’”107  And only afterward 
did the legal analysis begin.  Footnote 6 was a dictum, an aside that 
preemptively brushed off any arguments based on whether welfare is a right 
or a privilege.  It was not a holding reached through reasoned analysis; nor 
was it integral to the opinion. 
To be fair to Brennan, it is important to examine the quality of the 
dictum cited in Shapiro.  Afterall, if perfectly good law, it does not lose 
force by the path through which it finds it way into a given opinion.  To 
illustrate, a circuit court’s articulation of the pleading standard in federal 
courts that fails to cite Twombly and Iqbal is not rendered meaningless in 
any practical sense.108  In Sherbert, where the phrase originated, Brennan 
used it for the uncontroversial purpose of explaining that a rights/privilege 
 
 101.  See id. at 260. 
 102.  394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 103.  See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. 
 104.  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 105.  See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 621–22. 
 106.  Id. at 627. 
 107.  See id. at 627 n.6. 
 108.  But good luck finding a case that takes that approach. 
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dichotomy with regard to unemployment benefits was irrelevant in a case 
that, at bottom, concerned religious freedom.109  Thus Brennan took a 
statement that was true enough in one case, plucked it out of context and 
plugged it into a footnote in a second case, then relied on it as a point of law 
in a third case.110 
c.  Rule of law implications 
The threat to rule of law in cases such as these is plain.  The primary 
difference between inadvertent conflation and Brennan’s surreptitious 
lawmaking is intent.  In the former case, dictum becomes law through 
oversight.  With Brennan, dicta became law through calculated 
maneuvering. 
Rather than transparent lawmaking according to established procedure, 
this is opaque lawmaking by accident or subterfuge.  The lawmaking is 
accurately characterized as opaque because you cannot see it when it 
happens.  Only later, when a follow-up judicial opinion gives a mere aside 
the force of law, does it occur.  This sort of lawmaking is, of course, in 
contravention to the established procedure, given that all judges, scholars, 
and professionals agree that, under the American system, if you can 
conclude that a passage is dicta, you must also conclude that it is not the 
law.111  The approach leads to a lack of clarity in the law because one can 
never be sure when it will strike.  Should lawyers counsel their clients to 
treat adverse asides as authoritative, just in case they take on the mantle of 
law later? 
The tension between the retroactive law inherent in a common law 
system and the rule of law ideal is at its ebb when, as should always be the 
case, new law proclaimed in a holding is a natural extension of what came 
before, based on due consideration of adversarial arguments.112  When these 
safeguards—particularly the adversarial system and reasoned analysis—are 
not present, retroactive law becomes inconsistent with the rule of law.  
Litigants and their lawyers simply cannot adequately predict the law in such 
cases. 
That judges should be careful with how they employ dicta is true.  But 
dictum is inevitable.  It is subsequent judges who turn it into law. Thus, to be 
consistent with the rule of law ideal, judges should ensure that propositions 
they are prepared to cite as law make up the holding of a prior case.  It goes 
 
 109.  See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. 
 110.  See  Randy Lee, Twenty-Five Years After Goldberg v. Kelly: Traveling from the Right Spot 
on the Wrong Road to the Wrong Place, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 863, 887–88 (1994). 
 111.  See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 42, at 20 (“Cases have authority, dictum can be and is to 
be marked off from holding.”). 
 112.  See supra notes 21–30 and accompanying text. 
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without saying that Supreme Court justices should not resort to the tactics 
ascribed to Justice Brennan.  But if they do, their colleagues should learn 
from Justices Brennan and Powell.  They should be wary of problematic 
dicta when joining opinions and should ensure that it is not cited as law in 
subsequent opinions.  These steps would help the American judiciary get 
one step closer to the rule of law ideal. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
By definition (whichever you choose), dicta exist in every opinion.  
Otherwise, opinions would be all holding.  Therefore, describing dicta as a 
threat to the rule of law is inaccurate.  What matters is that dicta and holding 
be distinguishable and distinguished.  In the Ninth Circuit, the classic, 
narrow definition of dicta threatens rule of law ideals because reasonable 
jurists and attorneys can disagree on whether a given proposition is essential 
to the holding, because it has already proven concededly unworkable in at 
least one case, and because it represents a minority approach that fractures 
the circuit.  The metamorphosis of dicta into law, whether by oversight or 
calculated intent, is even more dangerous because it represents lawmaking 
without key safeguards—adversarial proceedings followed by reasoned 
analysis.  Not only is such lawmaking contrary to established procedure, it 
yields unpredictability because of its ex post nature.  Therefore, judges 
should be mindful of the vital but often overlooked distinction between 
holding and dicta and refrain from treating the latter as the former. 
~~~~ 
When Ted Olson stated before the Supreme Court that he did not want 
to argue about the definition of dicta, Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena 
Kagan challenged him in rapid succession, suggesting that, even by his 
narrow definition of dicta, the passage qualified.113  Arguing on behalf of the 
government as amicus curiae (and in favor of the respondent), the first 
question Malcolm Stewart fielded was from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
about “what has been called ‘dictum’ in Quality King.’”114  Stewart had no 
problem calling the passage a dictum in his response, making Olson the only 
advocate or judge willing to construe it as a holding.115  Nonetheless, it 
remained to be seen how the Court would treat the proposition.  Giving it the 
weight of the holding—thus determining the outcome of the case—would 
 
 113.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 25–26. 
 114.  Id. at 42. 
 115.  See id. at 43. 
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have been problematic for all of the reasons discussed in Part III.C.2.  
Taking the opportunity to define dicta and remind lower courts of the 
importance of carefully making the distinction between dicta and holding 
would put the United States judiciary one step closer to the rule of law ideal. 
In the end, the Court took an inconsequential baby step, paving no new 
ground but reiterating that dictum has no stare decisis effect.116  Indeed, in 
this regard, an otherwise fractured Court was unanimous.  Dissenting, 
Justice Ginsburg wrote that she would have followed Quality King’s dictum 
because she found it persuasive, but conceded that it was “dictum in the 
sense that it was not essential to the Court’s judgment.”117   
The dissent thus suggests that Justice Ginsburg adopts the traditional 
definition of dicta.  And Justice Breyer’s majority opinion impliedly rejects 
the majority Ninth Circuit approach to dicta.  In his view, the Quality King 
passage is not binding because it is “pure dictum.”118  That the passage 
embraced an issue not raised by the case, not briefed and argued, and not 
fully analyzed represented collateral support that it should be given little 
“legal weight.”119   Under the Ninth Circuit approach, these considerations 
would, of course, have been the very considerations that made it dictum in 
the first place.  While any definition of dicta in the majority opinion would 
have likely been just that (dicta), Justice Breyer’s naked conclusion that the 
Quality King assertion is a dictum leaves lower courts no better off in 
distinguishing dicta and holding than they previously were.  So it goes. 
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